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Abstract— The last decade has seen an increasing application 
of game theoretic tools in the analysis of electricity markets and 
the strategic behavior of market players. This paper focuses on 
the model examined by Fabra et al. (2008), where the market is 
described by a two-stage game with the firms choosing their 
capacity in the first stage and then competing in prices in the 
second stage. By allowing the firms to endogenously determine 
their capacity, through the capacity investment stage of the game, 
they can greatly affect competition in the subsequent pricing 
stage. Extending this model to the demand uncertainty case gives 
a very good candidate for modeling the strategic aspect of the 
investment decisions in an electricity market. After investigating 
the required assumptions for applying the model in electricity 
markets, we present some numerical examples of the model on 
the resulting equilibrium capacities, prices and profits of the 
firms. We then proceed with two results on the minimum value of 
price caps and the minimum required revenue from capacity 
mechanisms in order to induce adequate investments.   
Keywords — Capacity Constraints, Electricity Markets, 
Regulatory Policy, Strategic Behaviour. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE development of electricity markets all around the 
world has been accompanied by the announcement of a 
significant number of investments by market participants, 
either aiming to strengthen their position in the market or 
reflecting their desire to enter the market. In reality though, 
only a small percentage of these projects was actually 
completed or is under construction, while the majority of the 
announced investments will likely be cancelled. A clear and 
widely accepted explanation of this phenomenon doesn’t exist. 
Moreover, the investments in generation capacity are long 
term investments characterized by high fixed costs associated 
with significant risks. Generation units, and especially mid-
merit and peaking plants, can recover these costs during hours 
of high prices. Therefore, as prices result from the intersection 
of the supply and demand curves, producers have strong 
incentives to influence the supply curve by making it steeper.  
The strategic behavior of market participants has been 
examined extensively in the literature through the use of game 
theoretic tools. Still, the focus of most efforts was in the 
strategic bidding of the participants in the spot market. A 
comparatively unexplored area in the literature is related to the 
strategic investments in electricity markets, affecting directly 
and in a more consistent way the supply curve in the spot 
market than, for example, economic or physical withholding.  
In this paper we examine how a variation of the game-
theoretic model presented in [5] can be practically applied to 
electricity markets. More specifically, in Section II we briefly 
review the literature on modeling strategic behavior in 
electricity markets. In Section III we give the theoretical 
background of the model. In Section IV we discuss the model 
and how it can be applied in the context of electricity markets, 
giving at the same time some numerical results. Finally, in 
Section V we provide two applications with regulatory 
interest, on the minimum values for price caps and capacity 
mechanism revenues required to attract sufficient investments. 
II. LITERATURE SURVEY 
A. General 
The prediction and analysis of the strategic behavior of 
electricity market participants has been modeled using various 
approaches. A survey can be found in [1], where it is shown 
that there are three main lines of modeling trends: 
optimization, equilibrium and simulation models. Our focus in 
this paper falls in the equilibrium modeling of the market, both 
in the short term (corresponding to the second stage of our 
model), concerning spot market competition, as well as in the 
medium to long term (first stage of our model), representing 
investment decisions in imperfect electricity markets.  
B. Spot Market Competition 
The main models used in the electricity market literature are 
based on the competition models of Cournot, Stackelberg and 
Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE). On the contrary, the 
capacity constrained price competition models1, often used in 
economic literature, have not received much attention.  
The difference in the above models is the strategic variable 
of the players: in the Cournot and Stackelberg models firms 
compete in quantities, in the SFE in supply curves, and in the 
capacity constrained price competition model they compete in 
prices. The solution of all these games is based on the concept 
of Nash equilibrium.  
Most models in the literature apply the Cournot competition 
model, mainly due to its simplicity and ease in extending it. 
The main criticism against it is related to the use of quantities 
as strategic variables, when in reality firms submit supply 
curves in the form of stepwise increasing price-quantity 
functions. This is the main advantage of the SFE approach, 
                                                           
1
 In the capacity constrained price competition models we include both the 
Bertrand-Edgeworth type models, typically corresponding to a discriminatory 
auction, as well as the multi-unit auction models, where bids are offer prices 
corresponding to given capacities. 
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which on the other hand is characterized by complexity and 
multiplicity of equilibria. More details in the advantages and 
disadvantages of these models can be found in [1
references therein. A detailed comparison of the SFE and 
Cournot approach can also be found in [2].
The capacity constrained price competition model provides 
an interesting alternative to the Cournot and SFE ones, 
especially in the form of the multi-unit auction 
proposed in [3]2. Although it has seen less application than the 
first two, there has been an increasing number of papers 
applying it the last few years, especially in the context of the 
strategic investment models discussed below ([4]
C. Strategic Investment Models 
There are two strands of literature examining strategic 
investment in an imperfect electricity market. One strand 
examines the dynamic aspect of investments using simulation 
modeling (see for example [8]-[12]). These models exam
how a sequence of capacity investments decisions are made 
under uncertain and evolving market demand. The strategic 
decisions of the firms are modeled using either the Cournot or 
the Stackelberg competition framework. 
The second strand of literature, related to the present paper, 
involves game-theoretic models that study the strategic 
behavior of firms under a two-stage framework
[13]-[17]). The first stage of the model 
investment stage, where firms decide on how much cap
build, while on the second stage firms compete in the spot 
market. The two-stage game is solved by backward induction 
in order to find its subgame perfect equilibrium. These models 
examine a specific investment period (or cycle) of the market 
under a static environment, with the scope to “isolate” 
strategic behavior from exogenous parameters and thus better 
investigate it. Therefore, there seem to be well suited for 
studies on regulatory issues, as in [5] on market rules.
The work in [14]-[17] assumes Cournot competition in the 
second stage, while [5], [6] and [13] assume price competition 
under capacity constraints. All models, apart from [14], 
assume uncertain demand with a continuous demand 
distribution, while demand is inelastic (i.e. vertical) 
and [6]. Asymmetric firms (i.e. firms with different marginal 
and/or capacity costs) are considered only in [14] and [17]. 
Finally, no model assumes firms having initial capacities. 
The model presented in this paper is a variation of the one i
[5], involving a discrete demand function and non
marginal production cost. As we are mainly investigating how 
this model can be applied to electricity markets, we rely on 
[5], [18] and [19] for the theoretical background of the model.
III. THE THEORETICAL MODEL
A. General Description 
In this section we present a general framework under which 
someone can model an electricity wholesale market in a 
medium term horizon. The two-stage model presented is 
useful in investigating the strategic character of the inve
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 For reasons of tractability, usually a single price offer is assumed to be 
submitted, instead of multiple. It is shown though in [4] that the outcome of 
the auction “is independent of the number of admissible steps in the offer 
price-functions, so long as this number is finite”.  
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decisions of firms in an electricity market
affect aggregate investments and spot market prices. A 
number of simplified assumptions have been made in
make the model tractable, but the presented framework can be 
easily extended in numerous ways in order to account for all 
the peculiarities of electricity markets. 
More specifically, the electricity market is modeled as a two 
stage game under uncertainty. In the first stage firms choose 
their investments in generation capacity, while in the second 
stage firms compete in prices under capacity constraints. 
During the investment stage there is uncertainty about the 
future demand, which is resolved r
stage. We want to find the subgame perfect equilibria of the 
game, thus the game is solved by backward induction
solve the pricing stage and then, taking this solution as given, 
we proceed to the solution of
of the game is illustrated in Fig.1.
Fig.1. The timing of the game.
Investment Stage. At the investment stage, firms choose 
simultaneously the amount of capacity they want to build. 
Their decisions are irreversible. In order to have tractable 
results, we assume that the two firms choose the same 
technology, with capacity cost 
generally lumpy character of these investments. 
Demand Realization. We assume demand is price
and can be approximated by a binomial distribution function. 
Hence, demand can take two values, either the low demand 
value , with probability , with probability 1  . We assume that 
Both firms have the same beliefs for the demand
function. The value of demand is realized and revealed to both 
players between the investment
to the demand realization, we also assume that the 
decisions of each firm become common knowledge.
Pricing Stage. During the pricing stage, firms choose 
simultaneously prices and compete under capacity constraint
Bids are subject to a price cap , thus always allowing not only the recovery of the marginal 
cost but also of the capital cost. Both firms have the same 
marginal cost . We assume that the consumers first buy 
from the lowest priced firm and 
utilized they continue buying from the next firm, while firms 
are paid based on their offer
pricing4). Note that the competition held at the pricing stage 
involves only the newly installed capacity, as no initial 
capacity for the firms is considered.
In the following we will examine the model 
duopoly. It will be solved by backwards induction, thus we 
will first present the solution of the pricing stage, based on 
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 This is a common assumption in electricity market literature (see [5], [6]).
4
 Alternatively one could assume 
without significantly changing the results of the 
of the two designs and how they affect investments can be found in [5].
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Lemma 2 of [18] and Proposition 1 of [19], and then the 
solution of the capacity stage, based on Proposition 3 of [19].  
B. Pricing Stage 
In the pricing stage the two firms have capacities ,  = 1,2 with 0 ≤  = min,  ≤ max,  = , 
where with  we refer to the capacity of the small firm and 
with  to the capacity of the large firm. Then the solution of 
the pricing stage is given by Proposition 1. 
 Proposition 1 Suppose that the demand is . Then there is a 
unique equilibrium which satisfies the following: 
    (i) If  ≤ , there exists a unique pure-strategy 
equilibrium where both firms set prices equal to marginal cost 
and make zero expected profits. 
    (ii) If  <  <  + , a pure strategy equilibrium fails 
to exist. There is a unique mixed strategy equilibrium, where 
the large firm’s profit is ! − "! − " and the small 
seller’s profit is ! − "! − " #$min%#&,'( . Moreover, the 
support of the prices for both firms is the interval ) +
! − " '$#$min%#&,'(, *, with equilibrium price distributions for the 
small firm +,- = min.&,/0/ −
/.$
0/
123
423 and for the large firm 
+,- = .$0/ −
.$
0/
/.$
min5+,6
123
423  for  <  with a mass point of 
71 −  8 9 at  = , where : = min,  +  − . 
    (iii) If  ≥  + , in the unique equilibrium both firms 
set prices equal to the price cap and sell at their capacities. 
Proof The proof for (i) and (iii) is immediate, as (i) 
corresponds to the classical Bertrand competition result, while 
in (iii) capacity does not suffice so the price goes to the price 
cap. For the proof of (ii) the reader is directed to [18], as it is a 
slight generalization of Lemma 2. 
C. Capacity Stage with Demand Uncertainty 
Under demand uncertainty five regions need to be examined. 
Note that it will always hold  ≤  for the large firm, as it 
cannot sell more quantity than the maximum demanded and 
will avoid having excess capacity as it is costly.  
1.  +  ≤  <  
2.  ≤  ≤  +  ≤  
3.  ≤  ≤  ≤  +  
4.  ≤  ≤  +  ≤  
5.  ≤  ≤  ≤  +  
In each of those regions the expected profits of the two firms 
will be a linear combination of the profits derived in 
Proposition 1 for the corresponding demand value, weighted 
by its respective probability of realization. For example, 
assume we are in region 2. Then if the demand is equal to 
 =  the profits of the firms correspond to the ones of 
region (ii), while for  =  they correspond to region (i). All 
the profit functions corresponding to the above five regions 
can be found in the Appendix. The equilibrium capacities5 
then are characterized by the following proposition, based on 
Proposition 3 part (ii) in [19]6. 
                                                           
5
 Like in [5] and [19], we focus on pure strategy equilibria in the 
investment stage. 
6
 The result for  = 1 − ̃ can also be found in a revised version of [19] 
that recently came into our attention. 
Proposition 2 Suppose that the demand can take either the 
value , with probability  > 0, or the value , with 
probability 1 − . Moreover let ̃ = =>$?=. Then in any 
subgame perfect pure-strategy equilibrium, aggregate 
capacity is  if  ∈ !1 − ̃, 1" and  if  ∈ !0,1 − ̃". For 
 = 1 − ̃ any aggregate capacity in the interval , , - can 
be sustained as an equilibrium. 
Proof We refer the interested reader to [19]. 
Corollary 1 Let  < 1 − ̃. Then in equilibrium both firms 
make positive profits, while the profits per unit of capacity of 
the small firm are larger or equal to the ones of the large firm. 
Proof See the Appendix. 
In general the capacity stage is characterized by a 
multiplicity of equilibria which are proven to be very 
dependent on the parameter values, as it is can be seen in [19]. 
In order to present some numerical results of the model, we 
will characterize capacity equilibria under a specific set of 
parameter values7, as defined in Lemma 1. 
Lemma 1 Let  <  ≤ ABCB&=D$E and 3 > 1 − ̃ > . Then 
for the capacity stage there is a continuum of subgame perfect 
pure strategy equilibria, with equilibrium capacities being all 
pairs !, " with  ∈ )'GA ,!E&B"'G$B'HA$=D * and  =  − . 
IV. MODELING THE ELECTRICITY MARKET 
A. Applying the Model to Electricity Markets 
The proposed two-stage framework conceptually matches 
the decision stages of the wholesale electricity markets and the 
long run character of the investment decisions prior to the 
realization of uncertain demand. Moreover it accurately 
depicts the strategic complementarities of capacity decisions 
during the investment stage, which in turn are a crucial 
parameter in the results of the subsequent competition stage. 
The major drawback of the model, when compared to 
electricity markets, is the assumption of a single pricing stage 
period. Although this is the usual approach in the literature 
(for example in [5], [6]), in reality firms compete repeatedly 
during the life of their investment under a continuously 
evolving game, similar to the one examined in [8]. As the 
scope of the paper is to give some intuitive results that could 
be used as a benchmark, modeling in more detail the 
aforementioned stochastic game is left for another instance. 
Thus the pricing stage will be assumed to correspond to a 
representative trading period for the realized demand state. 
Still one can see that as long as all parameters8 of the game 
stay constant, the pricing stage will always give the same 
equilibrium9. This can be “exploited” in order to make the 
application of the model more realistic. 
A second aspect of the model that must be discussed is the 
interpretation of the demand and its distribution. Based on the 
formulation of the model, the demand in the pricing stage is 
                                                           
7
 Note, in relation to [19], that  ≤ ABCB&=D$E ↔  ≤ !E$=D"'GC'G$A'H < 1 − ̃. 
8
 These are: the player’s capacities, the demand values and probabilities 
and the costs (marginal and capacity). 
9
 We are solving for the non-cooperative equilibrium of the game, without 
considering issues related to repeated games like learning and discounting.  
  
covered only by the newly installed generation capacity
Provided that the range of the derived equilibrium capacities is 
not large and considering the generally increasing trend of 
demand and the retirement of older units, this underlying 
assumption of the model can be ignored. The demand value 
can either refer to the average expected demand (thus being 
high or low11), or it can correspond to a high and low demand 
state on the yearly load duration curve. In the latter case the 
probability  would refer to the relative weight of these 
periods. Since firms maximize expected profits over the 
demand states, both interpretations are equi
demand distribution, although a two point distribution may 
seem simplistic, in many cases the decisions of public 
authorities (ministries / regulators / TSOs) are based on 
high/low or high/medium/low demand scenarios, hence, at 
least for the scope of this paper, it is considered sufficient.
As far as the predictions of the model are concerned, the 
resulting continuum of equilibria is another drawback of the 
model, as it is not clear which of them will prevail. This gives 
little predictive value in the model and requires the application 
of an equilibrium selection method. Still though, the 
multiplicity of equilibria doesn’t prevent us from drawing 
some useful results from the model, presented in Section V. 
Finally, the presented model does not take into account the 
initial capacities of firms and a possible choice over different 
technologies. All these constitute possible extensions of the 
model, which will add some complexity
lead to the reduction of the number of equilibr
B. Conventions and Parameter Specification 
In order to proceed to the application of the model we first 
need to make some conventions and further assumptions: 
I. The capacity stage refers to an annual period, after the 
investments have been completed. The 
refers to one representative trading period (one hour). 
During this period all parameter values remain constant. 
II. There are N pricing stages, corresponding to the number 
of hours the generation plant is expected to run. The 
model examines only one representative stage.
III. The capacity cost c corresponds to the annualized 
investment cost of the plant, spread equally among the 
pricing stages12.  
Then we will apply the model for two technologies, a mid
merit CCGT operating 6000 hours and a peaking 
operating 200 hours. The hypothetical annualized capacity 
costs for the two technologies are 100,000 
CCGT and 50,000 €/MW-year for the OCGT, while their 
variable costs are 60 €/MWh and 100 €/MWh, respectively
For the demand we will investigate two scenarios, based on 
the two possible interpretations of demand described above:
                                                          
10
 Because only new capacity participates in the pricing stage.
could be considered as the contestable demand for new generation units.  
11
 In order to be exact, the states should be named high and medium, as our 
model implies that a third low demand state exists, corresponding to all 
periods where the market is not contestable by the examined technology. 
would be the case for example when nuclear units operate in the market, 
usually having contracted the total of their capacity at low 
12
 Since all pricing stages yield the same equilibrium profits.
13
 The assumptions on the parameter values 
illustrative purposes and have not been the result of an
10
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This 
or regulated prices.  
 
were made purely for 
 analysis. 
(A1) There are two equally probable (
demand,   and , with 
interpretation of the demand as the average yearly demand. 
(A2) The expected load duration curve is split in three parts, 
first by defining the hours the expected technology is going to 
be operating and then by splitting this interval so that the 
higher demand hours will be twice the lower demand hours. 
Then we set the value of 
the higher hourly demand interval, while 
similar way for the other interval. Following this procedure
will equal 2 38 , while at the same time we assume that the 
calculations lead to  = 1.
calculation for the case of the CCGT is illustrated in Fig.
both demand scenarios we assume 
Fig.2. Load duration curve approach for CCGT
C. Numerical Results of the Model
We now proceed to a num
based on the above comments. 
the CCGT plant, assuming that 
order to be able to satisfy the conditions of L
In Table I one can see the equilibrium capacities of the two 
firms, calculated for different
probability p in order to assess the robustness of our results
TABLE
EQUILIBRIUM CAPACITIE
It is interesting to note that although the two firms initially 
are symmetric, facing the same costs, in equilibrium they will 
have asymmetric capacities. Therefore it is expected that one 
firm will choose to be the small firm and one firm will choose 
to be the large firm. Why would a firm prefer to be small? 
being small it will have a greater return 
large firm (see Corollary 1). 
small range of equilibrium capacities and how 
respective values are even compared to the low demand value
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 The case  = 0.67 and  = 150
it will be omitted. The corresponding equilibria can be found in 
Equilibrium capacities of the larg
p\r 150 €/MWh 
0.33 [3000 , 3489.8] [3000 , 3280
0.50 [3000 , 3581.63] [3000 , 3366
0.67 - [3000 , 3453
Equilibrium capacities of the small firm
0.33 [2510.2 , 3000] [2719.42 , 3000]
0.50 [2418.37 , 3000] [2633.09 , 3000]
0.67 - [2546.76 , 3000]
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 equal to the average demand of  is calculated in a 
, p 
5 . As an example, the above 
 2. In  = 5,000 MWh. 
 
 
 
erical application of the model, 
We investigate only the case of  = 1.2 = 6,000 MWh, in 
emma 1.  
 values of the price cap r and the 
. 
 I 
S 
By 
on investment than the 
Note also, in this example, the 
low the 
. 
 €/MWh doesn’t fall under Lemma 1 so 
[19]. 
e firm
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300 €/MWh 600 €/MWh 
.58] [3000 , 3227.8] 
.91] [3000 , 3312.74] 
.24] [3000 , 3397.68] 
 
 [2772.2 , 3000] 
 [2687.26 , 3000] 
 [2602.32 , 3000] 
  
Now in the pricing stage we will examine separately the two 
demand cases. In the high demand case we will always have 
 +  = , with both firms offering their energy at the 
price cap. Assuming  = 150 €/MWh, the
belong to the intervals presented in Table II
TABLE II 
FIRMS’ PROFITS IN HIGH DEMAND CASE
 
Demand (A1) 
Large Firm Profits (€) [270,000 , 314,082] 
Small Firm Profits (€) [225,918 , 270,000] 
The low demand case is not as straightforward
pricing stage equilibrium is in mixed strategies. 
again  = 150 €/MWh. For illustration purposes, we will not 
restrict ourselves just to the equilibrium capacities, but will 
present the results of this case for various firm capacities. 
Then, from Proposition 1, we can calculate 
prices as shown in Table III. Note that the last line of Table 
depicts the equilibrium price supports, when
pair of capacities constitutes an equilibrium in the capacity 
stage. 
TABLE III 
SUPPORT OF PRICES IN LOW DEMAND CASE
Price Support based on Proposition 1 for  various firm
k- \ k+ 3250 MW 3500 MW 3750 MW 
0.6 k+ [144,150] [135,150] [126,150] 
0.7 k+ [135,150] [126,150] [117,150] 
0.8 k+ [126,150] [117,150] [108,150] 
0.9 k+ [117,150] [108,150] [99,150] 
k+ [108,150] [99,150] [90,150] 
 -k+ [122,150] [124,150] [126,150] 
Another interesting result, which can be seen in
that the price distribution of the large firm stochastically 
dominates the one of the small firm. This means it is more 
likely for the price of the small firm to be lower than the one 
of the large firm. Therefore the small firm is more likely to 
sell at capacity. 
Fig.3. Equilibrium Price Distributions for  = 150 €/MWh, 
and  = 2500 MW in the low demand case.
It is also interesting to note that the profits of the large firm, 
when in region (ii) of Proposition 1, are independent (directly) 
of the capacity of the large firm. Looking at 
this could be interpreted as if the large firm always chose to 
serve the residual demand, after the small firm has sold all its 
capacity. On the contrary the total profits of the small firm are 
always a specific percentage of the large firms’ profits, equal 
to  min, ⁄ .  
 firms’ profits will 
.  
 
Demand (A2) 
[270,000 , 322,347] 
[217,653 , 270,000] 
, as the 
We assume 
the support of the 
III 
 the respective 
 
s’ capacities 
4500 MW 6000 MW 
[106,150] [85,150] 
[97,150] [74,150] 
[88,150] [64,150] 
[79,150] 60 
[70,150] 60 
[130,150] 150 
 Fig. 3, is 
 
 = 3500 MW 
 
its profit function, 
TABLE
FIRMS’ PROFITS IN LOW DEMAN
Large firm’s profits for
k- \ k+ 3250 MW 3500 MW 
0.6 k+ 274,500 261,000 
0.7 k+ 245,250 229,500 
0.8 k+ 216,000 198,000 
0.9 k+ 186,750 166,500 
k+ 157,500 135,000 
 -k+ 202,500 225,000 
Small firm’s profits for various firms
0.6 k+ 164,700 156,600 
0.7 k+ 171,675 160,650 
0.8 k+ 172,800 158,400 
0.9 k+ 168,075 149,850 
k+ 157,500 135,000 
 -k+ 171,346 160,714 
V. APPLICATIONS
A. Defining the Minimum Price 
The most common measure for mitigating market power
especially in systems with tight capacity reserve margins
the use of price caps either on the offers of the generators or 
on the electricity spot price.
shown to effectively reduce the incentives of firms to 
manipulate market prices, they also have an important effect 
on the investment decisions of firms th
overlooked. This effect has been examined in a number of 
papers (see for example [20] and [21]), all st
caps may deter investments, especially of peaking capacity, if 
not appropriately chosen. 
One can see from Proposition 1
caps significantly affect the pricing strategies of the firms and 
thus their profits for each expected level of demand. This in 
turn directly affects the resulting equilibrium of the capacity 
stage, which can have serious implications on the security of 
supply of the electricity market: a “low” price cap may lead to 
inadequate investments on beha
the market may run into the risk of power curtailments.
The strategic model we presented can give 
define a benchmark for what may be considered as a “low” 
price cap. More specifically Proposition 2 states that
will invest enough to cover the high demand scenario only if    1  ̃ = 1  =>$?=, which is equivalent to 
According to the above inequality,
converge to the high aggregate capacity equilibrium, the price 
cap should be at least as high as the marginal cost of the 
examined technology plus its capital cost divided by the 
probability of appearance of the high demand. Mor
should be noted that the price cap is not dependant on the 
assumed values of the demand, but only on their probabilities, 
and that all parameters on the right hand side are exogenous.
Applying the model to the parameter values described in 
Subsection IV.B we obtain the results presented in Table 
TABLE
MINIMUM PRICE CAP VAL
 
Demand (A1)
Mid-merit (CCGT) 93.33 
Peaking (OCTT) 600 €/MWh
5
 IV 
D CASE 
 various firms’ capacities 
3750 MW 4500 MW 6000 MW 
247,500 207,000 126,000 
213,750 166,500 72,000 
180,000 126,000 18,000 
146,250 85,500 0 
112,500 45,000 0 
247,500 315,000 450,000 
’ capacities 
148,500 124,200 90,720 
149,625 116,550 60,480 
144,000 100,800 17,280 
131,625 76,950 0 
112,500 45,000 0 
148,500 105,000 0 
 
Cap 
, 
, is 
 Although price caps have been 
at should not be 
ressing how price 
 that, in our model, price 
lf of the participants and thus 
 
an easy way to 
 the firms 
 	   =E$B. 
 in order for the market to 
eover it 
 
V.  
 V 
UES 
 Demand (A2) 
€/MWh 110 €/MWh 
 850 €/MWh 
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Thus a relatively small price cap is sufficient for the 
CCGT’s, while a much larger price cap is required for the 
OCGT’s. More generally, if p takes values in the interval PEQ. CQR 
then the corresponding minimum price cap intervals for the 
CCGT and OCGT are ,82.22 ,126.66- and ,350 ,1100- 
respectively. The big difference between the range of values 
of the two price caps implies that the best policy, under the 
examined pay-as-bid framework, would be to implement 
different price caps on the offers of each generation unit 
technology, instead of a uniform market price cap15.  
B. Capacity Mechanisms 
Assume now that apart from a price-cap, a capacity 
mechanism is also available in order to solve the “missing 
money” problem of the more expensive units like OCGT. 
Practically, the main purpose of the capacity mechanism is to 
“push” the market to the high capacity equilibrium by 
reducing the investment cost of the firms. Then, if the firms 
receive an annual income of T, it must hold16 T >  −! − "!1 − "U. Applying the formula to various levels of 
price caps, for the case of the OCGT, we get the results 
presented in Table VI. 
TABLE VI 
MINIMUM REVENUE FROM CAPACITY MECHANISM FOR OCGT IN €/MW-YEAR 
 r=150 €/MWh r=300 €/MWh r=500 €/MWh 
Demand (A1) 41,000 26,000 6,000 
Demand (A2) 44,000 34,000 20,667 
The above exercise doesn’t necessarily have to be applied 
with r equal to the price cap. Instead one can use an even 
lower value which statistically the market rarely exceeds, 
depicting the empirical observation that prices rarely reach the 
price cap (see [21]).  
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper examines the application of a game-theoretic 
model, described in [5], meant to capture the strategic element 
of the investment decisions in electricity markets. The two 
stages of the model closely resemble the firm decision 
process, when determining their level of investments.  
Due to the stylized nature of the model, in order to apply it 
to real-world data, a series of assumptions and conventions 
need to be made. These involve mainly the period the model is 
examining, assumed here to be annual, and the representation 
of the demand uncertainty. As this paper is a first effort in 
investigating the applicability of the model in a realistic 
context, we have followed a static approach, closer to the 
spirit of the theoretical model. Alternatively, one could apply 
the model in a dynamic context, more accurately describing 
the stochastic demand and the spot market competition, or 
extend it, to account for initial capacities or asymmetric costs. 
Despite the simplicity of the applied model, it manages to 
give some straightforward results, especially important in a 
regulatory context. For example in Greece, where both a price 
                                                           
15
 It is interesting to note that if there were two technologies , V with 
 <  W and a regulator set different price caps on offers, so that  <
  < W, then the market could be treated as two separate markets, where the 
demand of  the “high marginal cost market” would correspond to the demand 
exceeding the aggregate capacity of technology  i. 
16
 The cost c here refers to the annual cost. 
cap and a capacity mechanism are in place, the relevant values 
have been set to r=150 €/MWh and T = 35,000€/MW-year. 
Although three new CCGT plants are expected to come on-
line in the next year, no OCGT plant is planned to be 
constructed, despite the official call for such investments. The 
model offers an explanation for this, as well as how it can be 
resolved, by the proper re-evaluation of the above values. 
APPENDIX: PROFIT FUNCTIONS AND PROOF OF COROLLARY 1 
As it was discussed in subsection III.C, in the demand 
uncertainty case there will be five regions. The (expected) 
profit functions in these regions are: 
(1)  XPro\its = !    "Pro\its = !    " _ 
(2)  `Pro\its = !  " )!  " #$min%'H.#&( + (1 − )* − Pro\its = ( − ),( − ) + (1 − )- −  _ 
(3)  `Pro\itsa = ( − ) )( − ) #$min%'H.#&( + (1 − )( − )#$#&* − Pro\itsa = ( − ), + (1 − ) − - −  _ 
(4)  XPro\itsb = ( − )(1 − ) − Pro\itsb = ( − )(1 − ) −  _ 
(5)  cPro\itsd = ( − )(1 − )( − )#$#& − Pro\itsd = ( − )(1 − )( − ) −  _ 
Since  < 1 − ̃, from Proposition 2 in equilibrium it will 
hold  = e − . Therefore by diving the profit functions 
by  − , denoting the scaled profit functions by  fghijkl  
and replacing  by e −  wherever needed, we get: 
(1)  cfghijkl  = (1 −  − ̃) + fghijkl  = (1 −  − ̃) +  _ 
(2)  `fghijkl  = (1 −  − ̃) +  #&min%'H.#&(.$fghijkl  = (1 −  − ̃) + ( +  − )_ 
(3)  `fghijkl a = (1 −  − ̃) +  #&min%'H.#&(.$fghijkl a = (1 −  − ̃) + ( +  − )_ 
(4)  cfghijkl b = (1 −  − ̃)fghijkl b = (1 −  − ̃) _ 
(5)  cfghijkl d = (1 −  − ̃)fghijkl d = (1 −  − ̃) _ 
The only profit function that isn’t clear if it is positive is fghijkl a. It will be so if  ≥  − , which always holds 
in region (3), as  ≥  −  >  − . 
Moreover, dividing each profit function by the 
corresponding firm’s capacity we notice that the profit per unit 
of capacity invested is equal for both the small and the large 
firm in Regions 1, 4 and 5, while it is larger for the small firm 
in Regions 2 and 3, as  .&min/H. & ≥ 1 = .&.& ≥ .&/H/G.&  . 
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